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Abstract We investigate the determinants of public support for EU membership using a panel of 
fifteen countries over the 1974 - 2008 period. The results indicate that increases in inflation and 
unemployment rate generate a decrease in support for EU membership, while growth of GDP 
growth increases support. There is evidence of erosion in citizens’ support as time in the Union 
accumulates and when the country is under the excessive deficit procedure. Splitting the sample 
into different periods reveals that real economic variables were more influential in shaping 
citizens’ support for the EU than nominal variables during the first years of the Community, but 




Keywords: European integration, public support, economic performance, panel-data 
 






This paper investigates the determinants of citizens’ support for European Union (hereafter, EU) 
membership. Public support is vital for the European integration process since governments’ abilities to 
proceed to higher levels of integration require the approval of citzens. In order for the EU to continue its 
integration process, it is important to understand what conditions citizens’ satisfaction with it
1. The paper 
contributes to a growing body of literature that investigates subjective perspectives of individuals on topics 
such as happiness (Frey and Stutzer, 2002) or satisfaction with democracy (Wagner et al., 2009). 
In little more than half a century of existence, the EU has become one of the most advanced systems of 
international economic and political integration in the world. The EU started as a common market for a few 
selected products, with only six member countries
2, aiming at guaranteeing peace in the years that followed 
World War II. It is currently a political and economic union that encompasses 27 countries and close to 500 
million citizens, with its own directly elected parliament, budget and constitution. The European integration 
process evolved through a series of treaties that implemented higher levels of integration, starting with the 
Treaty of Rome (1957), continuing with the Single European Act (1986), the Treaty of the European Union 
(1991), and culminating in the recent Treaty of Lisbon (2009).
3 
Given the transfer of economic powers from national governments to the EU’s supranational entities – 
with the adoption of a common currency as its most emblematic feature – the EU has increasingly  influenced 
each member state’s economic outcomes. Following the vote and popularity function literature, this paper 
assesses whether economic conditions in member states affect public support for the EU. That is, we ask 
whether citizens hold the EU accountable for their countries’ economic conditions and if this accountability 
has increased as the process of integration deepened. In addition to economic variables, we also account for 
                                                 
1 See Vaubel (1994a) for a survey on public choice analysis of European integration. 
2 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
3 For a description of the European integration process see Artis and Nixson (2007). 2 
 
political and institutional issues that might influence individuals’ attitudes towards EU membership. That is, we 
follow a public choice analysis of the European integration process by estimating a popularity function for the 
EU.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 surveys the literature on vote/popularity functions and 
support for the EU; section 3 presents the baseline empirical model; section 4 reports the empirical results; 
and finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on vote / popularity (VP) functions tries to explain vote support for incumbent politicians or 
their level of popularity with economic and political variables. The starting premise relies on Downs (1957)’s 
hypothesis that voters’ behaviour is driven by the goal of utility maximization. That is, citizens calculate 
expected future utility under competing candidates and vote for the one that offers more promising returns. If 
current and recent economic conditions signal future performance, then public support for politicians will vary 
with economic variables.  
The literature on VP-functions emerged in the 70s with the works of Mueller (1970), Goodhart and 
Bhansali (1970) and Kramer (1971). Many papers followed, testing new hypotheses regarding voters’ 
behaviour on specific countries or using panels of data.
4 A key issue in the debate is which economic 
indicators are important for voters, with inflation, unemployment and growth standing out as the most 
frequently used variables.
5 Another question of interest involves the length of voters’ backward time horizons 
as they make assessments of the state of the economy. Although most studies (Fair, 1978; Paldam and 
Nannestad, 2000; Veiga, 1998, among others) find voters to be myopic, some researchers argue that voters 
                                                 
4 See Paldam (2004), Hibbs (2006), and Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) for surveys on the topic. 
5 For a discussion on the role of macroeconomic theories in developing measures of economic performance, and 
empirical tests on a panel of 13 democracies, refer to Chappell and Veiga (2000). 3 
 
analyse economic performance during the entire term of office (Peltzman, 1990; and Hibbs, 2000). The 
question of how expectations are formed also generated debate in the VP-functions, with some authors (i.e. 
Key, 1966; Alesina et al., 1993; Hibbs, 2000; Nickelsburg and Norpoth, 2000; and Veiga and Veiga 2004) 
arguing that individuals look back when they form their opinion about politicians, and others suggesting that 
they look forward (Erikson et al., 2000).  
The use of individual-level survey response data to estimate VP functions
6 allowed for new hypothesis 
regarding voter’s behaviour to be tested. An interesting question is whether voters are egotropic (care about 
their personal economic situation) or sociotropic (care about the macroeconomic situation of the country). 
Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) were the first to analyse this issue and concluded that US voters are sociotropic, 
but other studies have found evidence compatible with the hypothesis of egotropic voting. 
Building on the main findings of the literature on VP-functions, this paper presents a popularity function for 
the EU. Given that the process of European integration has reduced the autonomy of national governments in 
economic policymaking, it is likely that EU citizens hold the Union accountable for the economic situation in 
their country. As Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) have pointed out, as the European integration process 
moved forward, public opinion about the EU departed from a “permissive consensus” to a more active and 
critical stance towards the EU, so we expect the economic situation of state members to have a larger 
influence on EU’s popularity in more recent years of the Union.  
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) were the first to investigate the aggregate–level dynamics of public support 
for European Community membership with an approach similar to VP-functions. Using data from the 
Eurobarometer’s questionnaires, they explained variations in the EU’s popularity with national macroeconomic 
outcomes. In their study, inflation has a strong negative effect on the support for the European Community; 
the ratio of the country’s intra-European Community exports to its total exports has a positive impact, and net 
                                                 
6 Refer to Dutch and Stevenson (2008) and Brug et al. (2007) for recent examples. 4 
 
receipts of the country from the European Community budget seem no have no effect. Vaubel (1994b) reports 
similar results regarding trade integration and net budgetary contributions. However, Anderson and 
Kaltenthaler (1996) found that in addition to inflation, unemployment and GDP growth also exert a statistically 
significant impact on EU’s popularity. 
Following a different approach, Gabel and Palmer (1995), Gabel (1998) and Anderson and Reichert 
(1996) use micro-economic data to look for the costs and benefits associated with EU membership for each 
citizen as an individual. Their multivariate analyses confirm the influence of education, occupational skills, 
income, and proximity to EU borders on citizens’ support for the European integration process. Others, 
including Ingleheart (1970), Hewstone (1986), Ingleheart et al. (1991) and Janseen (1991), analysed the 
influence of individual values in shaping attitudes towards the EU. These studies find that citizens’ abilities to 
understand the full range of the European integration process, their political ideologies, and their support for 
the national government play a major role in shaping opinions about the EU.  
Mahler et al. (2000) explore the determinants of public attitudes towards the EU through national, regional 
and individual level analyses. On a national level, they found that net budgetary receipts from the EU, trade 
with fellow EU members, and inflation affect support for the union. Their findings at the regional level are 
similar, with the receipt of EU regional aid being the most important determinant of a region’s support for the 
EU. On an individual level, their results indicate that Eurobarometer respondents’ self-reported personal 
incomes have a positive influence on their support for the EU.   
As we have noted, the number of papers investigating the determinants of public support for EU 
membership is not large, and most were written in the 1990’s, implying that the most recent years of the 
European integration history have not been analysed. This paper intends to fill this gap in the literature. In 
addition, because we have longer time series, we are able to investigate how support for the EU has changed 
as integration has become more complete. 5 
 
 
3. The Empirical Model 
Our proxy for citizens’ support for the EU was constructed using data from the Eurobarmeter surveys. 
Eurobarometers are public opinion surveys that have been conducted twice a year in all EU countries since 
1973. These questionnaires are used to assess public opinion on a variety of topics, such as EU’s policies 
and institutions, religion, and politics.  Each survey is based on a different random sample, which makes the 
opinion of a specific individual impossible to analyze over time. Each survey is also followed by a Standard 
Report, presenting an analysis and summary the main results. 
Answers to the following question were used to create an index of EU’s popularity: “Generally speaking, do 
you think that your country’s membership of the EU is: (a) a good thing; (b) a bad thing; (c) neither good nor 
bad.” This question has been present in all Eurobarometers since 1974, allowing for consistent measurement 
of public support for the European integration process throughout the 1974 to 2008 sample period. Data was 
retrieved for the first 15 EU members, that is, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The respondents 
who answered “Don’t know” were discarded; and other responses were calculated as percentages of all 
respondents with an opinion. The following three indexes were then computed, in order to obtain a single 
value for country i at time t: Index 1 = a + 0,5c; Index 2 = a – b; and Index 3 = a - 0,5c - b. 
As an alternative to the estimation of a popularity function for the EU, a voting function for European 
Parliament elections might also be used to investigate the determinants of the support for the European 
integration process. However, Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; Marsh, 1998; and Kousser, 2004 have 
shown that European Parliament elections are “second order elections,” since they are used by citizens to 
signal support (or the lack of it) for their national governments. Therefore, European Parliament elections are 
probably a poor indicator of support for the EU. 6 
 
The baseline empirical model is specified as follows: 
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where CSit stands for an index of citizens’ support for EU membership in country i, at time t, p is the number 
of lags to be included in the model, EVit and PIVit represent matrices of economic, political and institutional 
variables that may have a significant impact on individuals’ support for the EU. β and θ are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated,  i υ is the individual effect of country i and εit is the error term. Since surveys are 
administered twice a year, each time period refers to a half-year interval. 
Lags of the dependent variable are included as explanatory variables in order to account for the 
persistence of EU popularity over time. We expect increases in inflation and unemployment to have a negative 
impact on public support for the EU. Higher growth of GDP or private consumption and net budgetary receipts 
from the EU should have positive effects. We also test whether the degree of openness of the economy
7 and 
trade with fellow EU members play a part in the formation of public attitudes toward the EU.   
The economic explanatory variables represented in the equation (1) by matrix EVit were retrieved from 
several sources. Inflation, unemployment rate and private consumption series were taken from the OECD 
Economic Outlook, except for the unemployment rate series for Belgium, Denmark, France, and the UK, 
which were obtained from Eurostat. Private and government consumption data was also collected from the 
Eurostat’s statistics database. Quarterly data on exports, imports, and GDP was gathered from the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS). Data on the trade volume with 
other EU countries was extracted from the AMECO database. The EU’s budget figures were taken from the 
Court of Auditors Annual Reports. Values for intra EU trade and the EU budget are available only on an annual 
                                                 
7 The degree of openness of the economy was calculated according to the following formula DOEit = (IMPit+EXPit)/GDPit, 
where IMPit is the level of imports of country i in year t, EXPit is the level of exports for the same country, in the same 
period, and GDPit is the gross domestic product for that country at that time. 7 
 
basis. For these variables, we assign half of the annual amount to each half-year period. In every model 
specification, all other economic variables are measured as two-quarter averages.  
Political and institutional factors, represented in equation (1) by vector PIVit, may also affect the EU’s 
popularity. Those include honeymoon effects, the length of each country’s membership in the EU, the impact 
of European Parliament’s elections, and the effect of Excessive Deficit Procedures. The honeymoon effect 
represents a state of grace that the EU may enjoy in a country immediately after it joins the Union, because its 
citizens may be overjoyed with the fact that they are now members of the EU. In the model, this is captured 
by a discrete variable assuming positive values for the first (eight, six or four) half-year periods after each 
country enters the EU, and zero in the remaining periods. When we assume the honeymoon effects to last 
three years, this variable takes the value of six in the first semester the country joins the EU, five in the 
second, and so on, until it assumes the value of one in the sixth semester and zero for the remaining periods. 
It is also likely that as time in the Union goes by citizens get increasingly disappointed with it, and 
therefore less supportive. To test this hypothesis, the variable membership length assumes a value 
corresponding to the number of periods that each country has been a member of the EU. A negative sign is 
expected for the estimated coefficient associated with this variable for the reason given above.  
As for the European Parliament elections, we suspect that before elections more information about 
European issues is passed on to voters, which may affect their attitudes towards the EU. According to 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), the introduction of direct elections for the European Parliament was motivated, 
at least partially, by the belief that European election campaigns would increase voters’ support for the 
community. A dummy variable was included, which takes the value 1 in each semester when European 
Parliament elections were held, and 0 otherwise. 
The convergence criteria set in the Stability Growth Pact, in 1996, established that countries not 
complying with the public debt to GDP and budget deficit to GDP ratios (60% and 3%, respectively) would be 8 
 
subject to an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), administered by the European Commission. Given the 
restrictive nature of the EDP, it is expected that when governments are subjected to them, they will blame the 
EU for negative short-run consequences in the country’s economy. Therefore, when countries are under the 
EDP, it is likely that the EU’s popularity diminishes. To study this effect, a dummy variable was created, 
assuming the value of 1 whenever a country is under the EDP, and zero for all remaining periods. 
Data on the European Parliament Elections, the Excessive Deficit Procedures, and the entrance date of 
each member state was retrieved from the European Union’s official website (http://europa.eu). Summary 
statistics for both the dependent and the explanatory variables included in the empirical model are presented 
in Table 1.  
[Table 1 here] 
 
4 Citizens’ support for the EU 
 
4.1. Econometric issues 
The baseline econometric framework for estimating the model described above is the fixed effects 
method, although some models were also estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for purposes of 
comparison. The fixed effects model is appropriate when there is correlation between the error term and the 
regressors due to unobserved individual effects. Given that there are country-specific social, economic, 
political, and institutional characteristics that are likely to have a permanent influence, on citizens’ support for 
the EU, the fixed effects method is justified. Both the Haussman test and the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test indicate the existence of correlation between the regressors and the error term, supporting the 
use of the fixed effects method instead of the random effects method.  
Although we are estimating a dynamic model, the Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalized Method of 
Moments estimator was not used since it is better suited for datasets with a large number of individuals and a 9 
 
small number of periods, which is clearly not our case. A Fisher test for panel unit root, using an augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test, was performed in order to assess whether the dependent variable is stationary or not. The 
test rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root, allowing for the estimation of the model in levels.  
 
4.2 The baseline empirical model 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of models using each of the three popularity indices proposed 
previously as the dependent variable. All models share the same explanatory variables, in order to make 
comparisons straightforward. As can be seen from the Table, public support for the EU shows strong 
persistence over time. The first two lags of the dependent variable are always statistically significant and the 
sum of the estimated coefficients associated with them is around 0.8. All fixed effects estimation results reject 
the null hypothesis that the country dummies are all zero. Regardless of the index used as dependent variable, 
the R-squared, t-statistics, and the significance levels of variables are similar. From now on, we will focus on 
estimation results using index 1, because this index ranges from 0 to 100, making results easier to interpret. 
[Table 2 here] 
Regarding the economic variables, the estimated coefficient associated with inflation in the previous 
period is always statistically different from zero at the 1% confidence level. When the inflation rate increases 
one percentage point, public support for the EU falls by approximately 0.6 points. GDP growth is not 
statistically significant, although when using OLS it turned out to be marginally statistically significant, and with 
the expected sign (positive) in all models. The degree of openness of the economy is signed as expected but it 
is not statistically significant.
8 Finally, the variable that represents the length of each country’s membership is 
statistically significant and negatively signed, indicating that as time goes by public support for the EU 
                                                 
8 The percentage of trade with EU countries was tested as an alternative variable to the degree of openness of the 
economy, since their correlation is 70%. Like the degree of openness, it turned out to be positively signed but not 
statistically significant in most of the estimations. 10 
 
decreases. Therefore, for all else equal, countries that have been members of the EU for longer periods of 
time tend to be less supportive of the EU. A possible explanation for this result is that citizens from older 
member states may not be enthusiastic about the more recent members, particularly if those countries are 
economically weaker and compete for the EU budget’s transfers. 
To test if other real economic variables have an effect on public support for the EU, the GDP growth rate 
was replaced by the unemployment rate. As can be seen from the first column of Table 3, the coefficient 
associated with the unemployment rate is negative, as expected, but it is not statistically significant. Results 
for the other variables are very similar to the previous estimation, except for the degree of openness of the 
economy that is now marginally statically significant. Its positive coefficient suggests that the EU has a larger 
support base in countries more open to international trade. To permit the possibility that individuals respond 
more to changes than levels, in column 2 we report the results for a regression using the growth rate of the 
unemployment rate. This variable turned out to be statistically significant at the 5% level and larger than the 
inflation effect.
  When the growth in the unemployment rate increases by one standard deviation, public 
support for the EU falls by approximately 0.6 points. Government consumption and the EU budget, each 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, were also tested as explanatory variables. However, neither was 
statistically significant.  
[Table 3 here] 
In order to test the impact of European Parliament elections, the Excessive Deficit Procedure, and 
honeymoon effects on public support for the EU, three dummy variables were included in the model. The last 
column of Table 3 presents estimation results for these specifications. There is evidence of an erosion of 
public support for the EU when the country is under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. This is not surprising, 
since in these periods members states have to adopt restrictive fiscal policies in order to return the deficit to 
GDP ratio to the 3% limit imposed by the EU. Although signed as expected, the variables for honeymoon 11 
 
effects and European Parliament elections are not statistically significant.
9 This implies that there is no positive 
bias in public opinion about the EU in the first years the country joins the Union and that citizens don’t change 
their opinion about the EU in European electoral periods, when information about European issues is more 
easily available through the media.  
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that there are significant country effects at the 1% 
confidence level. Table 4 presents the estimated coefficient for each country specific effect for the last 
equation reported in Table 3. All of the six EU founding members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxemburg and Netherlands) have high positive coefficients, which is in accordance to our expectations since 
the process of European integration began in those countries. They have shaped the European institutions and 
policies according to their interests and have benefited from stronger bargaining power in the negotiations with 
new entrants.  
[Table 4 here] 
 There are great differences in public opinion in the countries joining the European Community in 1973. 
UK’s reluctance to fully embrace the EU has been evident ever since it began negotiating its entrance, and 
this is confirmed by a negative estimated coefficient. Denmark’s negative coefficient is also not surprising, 
since the Danish people rejected the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in a 1992 referendum. Ireland, on 
the other hand, has a positive coefficient. The country approved the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992, and enjoyed a long period of economic growth, especially during the 1990s, that the Irish people may 
attribute to their EU membership. Greece, the solo entrant of 1981, also has  a positive coefficient, as does 
Spain, who joined the Community five years latter and has enjoyed great spells of growth since then. The 
coefficient associated with Portugal is very close to zero. The country also entered the Community in 1986, 
but has not been able to achieve a similar improvement of its economic situation. 
                                                 
9 The variable for honeymoon effects included in the regression refers to a period of two years, but larger periods (three 
and four) were also tested. 12 
 
The three most recent members in our sample (Austria, Finland and Sweden) joined the union in 1995, 
and they have the largest negative coefficients. This is not surprising, since it took them much longer to 
embrace the ideals of economic integration. These countries were already quite rich when they joined the EU, 
and their citizens may consider that there are no significant benefits from giving up part of their autonomy to 
European supranational authorities and joining a union with poorer nations. 
 
4. 3 Time Evolution 
The European integration process was slow and progressive. It took more than half a century for the union 
to reach the level of integration experienced by its members today. During this period, not only the level of 
integration changed, but the economic environment changed as well. Therefore, it is likely that the way 
individuals incorporate economic conditions on their opinions about the EU has changed over time. In order to 
study how different levels of economic integration changed the way citizens form their opinion about the EU, 
the sample was split into three periods, according to the two most important changes in the EU’s integration 
levels: 
•  1974 – 1987 (13 years): The first period goes from the beginning of the sample until the coming 
into effect of the Single European Act.
10 
•  1987 – 1993 (6 years): The second period starts with the Single European Act and ends with the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty and the definition of the convergence criteria. 
•  1994 – 2008 (14 years): The last interval of time begins with the coming into effect of the Treaty of 
the European Union,
11 and extends until the end of the sample.  
                                                 
10 The Single European Act was signed in 1986 and come into effect on July 1
st 1987. 
11 The Treaty of the European Union was signed in Maastricht in December 1991, and came into effect after November 
1993.  13 
 
We have considered dividing the last period in two, in order to separate the time before and after the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), but we ultimately decided not to do so because before the EMU its 
members were already bound to comply with the convergence criteria. Of course, an additional split would 
also reduce the number of degrees of freedom in the estimations. Summary statistics for each period 
concerning the most relevant economic variables used in the previous estimations are presented in table 5. 
[Table 5 here] 
Estimation results for different time periods are presented in Table 6.
12 As expected, the impact of 
economic conditions on public support for the EU varied over time. During the first period considered (1974 to 
1987), only GDP growth seems to influence public support for the EU (inflation and unemployment growth are 
never statistically different from zero). The degree of openness of the economy is negatively signed. Since 
open economies are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks, it is reasonable that openness would be inversely 
related to EU support during this period that includes two large oil price shocks.
13 
[Table 6 here] 
Empirical results for the second period (1987-93) reveal that the growth rate of the unemployment rate 
exerts the largest effect on the EU popularity, and has a larger coefficient than in the previous period 
indicating that individuals attribute a much larger importance to it in their evaluations. This is not surprising, 
given that the average unemployment rate is larger in the second period than in the first. The degree of 
openness of the economy is now positively signed and marginally statically significant in the estimation of 
column 3, reinforcing our interpretation that more open economies were more affected by the oil shocks and 
once the shocks disappeared, EU citizens viewed international trade as a positive thing.
14 It should also not be 
                                                 
12 For some estimations the second lag of the dependent variable turned out not to be statistically significant and was 
excluded from the regression. 
13 The percentage of trade with EU countries was tested as an alternative variable to the degree of openness of the economy but 
turned out not to be statistically significant. 
14 As for the previous period, the percentage of trade with EU countries was not statistically significant when included in the 
regression. 14 
 
forgotten that this periods starts in 1987, when the Single European Act (SEA) was implemented, establishing 
a commitment to complete the single market by the end of 1992, and raise the integration of decision making 
processes across members of the European Economic Community (EEC). The years preceding the SEA made 
clear that the changing international political environment required greater consistency of members’ external 
policies, at least if the community was to be an important player in the new international scheme. The EEC’s 
economy needed to have a more flexible and liberalized market in order to compete as a global power in the 
world economy.  
In the estimations for the last period considered in the sample (1994 - 2008), the degree of openness of 
the economy turned out to be positively signed but statistically insignificant, and was replaced by the 
percentage of trade with EU countries. As can be seen in the last two columns of Table 6, trade with fellow EU 
members is now a relevant variable influencing support for the EU. Furthermore, real economic variables 
(GDP growth rate and growth of the unemployment rate) are no longer significant, but inflation now affects EU 
support. Inflation is statistically significant and has a much larger coefficient than in the previous two periods. 
Since this period starts with the implementation of the Treaty of the European Union and the imposition of the 
Maastricht criteria for countries willing to participate in the creation of a monetary union, it is not surprising 
that citizens attribute more importance to inflation. The decline in the unemployment rate during this period 
may also justify the reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient associated with the unemployment growth 
rate. Another difference from previous periods is that in semesters where European Parliament elections are 
held voters are less in favour of the EU. Finally, there is evidence that when countries are under the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure public support for EU diminishes. 
 To make comparison between periods before and after the Maastricht Treaty more straightforward, we 
have estimated the model for the complete pre-Maastricht period (1974 to 1993) and for the subsequent 
period (1994-2008) with only the first nine EU members, instead of all the 15 nations included in the sample. 15 
 
Results, presented in Table 7, reinforce previous conclusions. Before the Treaty of the Monetary Union, real 
economic variables were the main determinants of citizens’ opinions about the EU, since both the growth of 
GDP and of the unemployment rate are statistically significant at the 5% significance level. After the Maastricht 
Treaty came into effect, inflation became the main economic variable influencing EU popularity. It is also 
worth noticing that the coefficient associated with inflation is larger in the estimations for the first nine 
countries than for the 15. After the Maastricht Treaty, the percentage of trade with fellow EU countries exerts a 
positive influence on public support for the EU, while being under the Excessive Deficit Procedure or having 
Parliamentary elections diminishes it. 
[Table 7 here] 
 
5 Conclusion 
Understanding how public opinion about EU membership is formed is important because citizens’ support 
for the EU influences its legitimacy and functioning. National governments will be more reluctant to adopt 
policies fostering integration if they are not supported by the electorate. Citizens have been called upon to 
directly decide some European issues through referenda, and also express their views through elections for 
the European Parliament.  
Using a panel for the first fifteen EU members over a sample period from 1974 to 2008, we investigated 
the determinants of public support for EU membership. Among the economic explanatory variables, inflation 
and the growth in unemployment have a negative impact on the EU’s popularity, while GDP growth exerts a 
positive influence. When the sample is split into shorter time periods, we find evidence that economic 
variables exerted different influences on individuals’ attitudes toward the EU over time. Real economic 
variables seem to be more important than nominal variables during the first years of the EU, with 
unemployment being especially relevant between 1987 and 1993, when it was particularly high. After the 16 
 
implementation of the Treaty of the European Union, inflation became much more relevant for public support 
for the EU, as well as the percentage of trade with other EU countries.  
There is also evidence of the existence of erosion in public support toward the EU as time in the Union 
accumulates, and after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty EU popularity also falls when countries are under 
the excessive deficit procedure or have European Parliament elections. An analysis of country specific effects 
reveals that the EU is more popular among its founding members and receives much less support in the 1995 
entrants (Austria, Finland and Sweden) and in the UK. 
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
  
   No Obs.  Mean  Stand Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Popularity Index 1  855  74.36  12.44  36.17  94.38 
Popularity Index 2  855  48.72  24.89  -27.66  88.77 
Popularity Index 3  855  36.44  27.70  -39.36  85.20 
Inflation  1,038  0.01  0,01  -0.004  0.08 
GDP Growth Rate  841  0.01  0.03  -0.12  0.15 
Unemployment Rate  857  0.07  0.04  0.01  0.24 
Unemployment Growth Rate  842  0.01  0.11  -0.22  0.80 
Degree of Openness of the Economy  845  0.78  0.47  0.29  3.30 
Percentage of Trade with EU countries  966  0.64  0.09  0.38  0.85 
Private Consumption  734  0.53  0.07  0.16  0.76 
Government Consumption  754  0.21  0.03  0.07  0.30 
Honeymoon effect (2 Years)  1.050  0.06  0.42  0  4 
European Parliament Elections  1.050  0.08  0.28  0  1 
Excessive Deficit Procedures  1.050  0.04  0.20  0  1 
Membership Length  1.050  36  28  0  94 
Economy Previous Year Index 1  147  -17.17  23.31  -71.71  28.34 
Economy Previous Year Index 2  147  266.04  46.73  156.56  359.68 
Economy Previous Year Index 3  147  13.93  8.72  1.04  36.41 
Household Financial Situation Previous Year Index 1  140  -9.54  13.41  -51.01  14.28 
Household Financial Situation Previous Year Index 2  140  281.09  26.95  197.98  331.56 
Household Financial Situation Previous Year Index 3  140  11.39  4.67  2.02  26.26 
Economy Next Year Index 1  311  -13.53  23.36  -63.29  50.00 
Economy Next Year Index 2  311  41.20  6.97  22.72  66.44 
Economy Next Year Index 3  311  -33.86  21.09  -77.84  31.89 
Household Financial Situation Next Year Index 1  315  9.43  14.31  -74.64  40.90 
Household Financial Situation Next Year Index 2  315  34.89  5.88  20.83  56.25 
Household Financial Situation Next Year Index 3  315  -18.94  13.36  -80.28  21.59 
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Table 2 – The baseline model: alternative indexes 
  Index 1  Index 2  Index 3 
Popularity (-1)  0.61***  0.61***  0.60*** 
  (11.81)  (11.85)  (12.05) 
Popularity (-2)  0.20***  0.21***  0.20*** 
  (4.86)  (5.01)  (5.04) 
Inflation (-1)  -65.39***  -130.3***  -155.0*** 
  (-3.33)  (-3.31)  (-3.19) 
GDP Growth Rate (-1)  10.41  20.76  21.41 
  (1.48)  (1.51)  (1.40) 
Degree of Openness of the Eco. (-1)  2.78  5.55  6.69 
  (1.48)  (1.47)  (1.49) 
Membership Length  -0.046*  -0.091*  -0.11** 
  (-2.08)  (-2.08)  (-2.17) 
Constant  13.62***  9.19**  7.36* 
  (4.38)  (2.64)  (2.02) 
Observations   616  616  616 
Adjusted R - Squared   0.64  0.64  0.63 
Countries  15  15  15 
Fixed Effects  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
Notes: t statistics in brackets obtained with robust standard errors. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: *** 
1%, ** 5% and *10%. For all fixed effects models, Prob > F = 0, providing evidence of the existence of Fixed Effects. Robust 
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Table 3 – Additional tests using Index 1 
   1   2  3 
Popularity (-1)  0.59***  0.61***  0.60*** 
  (9.81)  (10.32)  (10.65) 
Popularity (-2)  0.18***  0.17***  0.18*** 
  (3.65)  (3.40)  (4.12) 
Inflation (-1)  -51.48**  -23.18  -22.52 
  (-2.21)  (-1.09)  (-1.05) 
Unemployment rate (-1)  -6.25    
  (-0.91)    
Degree of Openness of the Economy (-1)  3.25*  2.30  1.85 
  (1.83)  (1.49)  (1.28) 
Membership Length   -0.07**  -0.05**  -0.04** 
  (-2.88)  (-2.49)  (-2.22) 
Unemployment Rate Growth Rate (-1)    -5.50**  -5.13** 
   (-2.68)  (-2.39) 
Excessive Deficit Procedures     -0.83* 
     (-2.10) 
European Parliament Elections     -0.35 
     (-1.03) 
Honeymoon Effect     1.03 
     (1.42) 
Constant  17.72***  16.88***  16.89*** 
  (4.17)  (4.50)  (4.90) 
Adjusted R - Squared  0.62  0.63  0.63 
Observations  576  571  571 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: t statistics in brackets obtained with robust standard errors. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: *** 
1%, ** 5% and *10%. For all fixed effects models, Prob > F = 0, providing evidence of the existence of Fixed Effects. Robust 
standard errors used in all models. 
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 Table 4 - Country Specific Effects 
Country  1978-2008 
Belgium  0.66 
France  1.54 
Germany  1.07 
Italy  2.77 
Luxembourg  0.59 
Netherlands  2.78 
Denmark  -1.36 
Ireland  1.59 
United Kingdom  -2.90 
Greece  0.43 
Portugal  -0.06 
Spain  0.72 
Austria  -5.27 
Finland  -4.60 
Sweden  -4.99   25
 
Table 5 - Summary Statistics by Period 
1974-1987                
  No Obs.  Mean  Stand Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Popularity Index 1  280  74.24  13.88  36.17  92.71 
Inflation 399  0.02  0.01  -0.004  0.08 
Unemployment Rate  233  0.06  0.04  0.01  0.21 
Unemployment Growth Rate  219  0.04  0.15  -0.26  0.81 
GDP Growth Rate  258  0.01  0.04  -0.12  0.15 
Degree of Openness of the Economy  259  0.59  0.22  0.29  1.52 
Percentage of Trade with EU countries  351  0.59  0.09  0.38  0.78 
1987-1993          
  No Obs.  Mean  Stand Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Popularity Index 1  154  81.11  9.20  54.21  94.39 
Inflation 193  0.01  0.009  -0.002  0.05 
Unemployment Rate  182  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.22 
Unemployment Growth Rate  182  0.02  0.12  -0.24  0.64 
GDP Growth Rate  156  0.01  0.02  -0.08  0.12 
Degree of Openness of the Economy  156  0.64  0.28  0.36  1.43 
Percentage of Trade with EU countries  175  0.68  0.07  0.54  0.80 
1994-2008    
  No Obs.  Mean  Stand Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Popularity Index 1  421  71.98  11.57  40.53  92.55 
Inflation 446  0.005  0.003  -0.003  0.02 
Unemployment Rate  442  0.07  0.03  0.01  0.24 
Unemployment Growth Rate  441  -0.01  0.09  -0.22  0.37 
GDP Growth Rate  427  0.01  0.03  -0.05  0.15 
Degree of Openness of the Economy  430  0.95  0.58  0.41  3.31 
Percentage of Trade with EU countries  440  0.68  0.07  0.55  0.86 
Source: IMF, Eurostat, OECD          
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Table 6 - Sample Division by time periods 
   1974-1987  1987-1993  1994-2008 
   1  2  3  4  8  9 
Popularity (-1)  0.44***  0.27*  0.54***  0.58***  0.54***  0.54*** 
  (5.27)  (1.90)  (6.32)  (7.99)  (7.05)  (7.47) 
Popularity (-2)  0.14        0.13**  0.14** 
 (2.37)**        (2.35)  (2.47) 
Inflation (-1)  -92.20  -103.1  22.96  87.22  -163.53**  -170.45** 
  (-1.31)  (-1.59)  (0.15)  (0.61)  (-2.62)  (-2.86) 
GDP Growth Rate (-1)  22.55*    18.55    7.17   
  (2.10)    (1.26)    (1.06)   
-3.89  -18.15*  -4.12  Growth Rate of the 







-6.07  -22.41**  22.01*  9.20  Degree of Openness of the 
Economy (-1)  (-1.20) (-2.63)  (2.10)  (1.01) 
        
       
16.76** 15.88**  Percentage of Trade with EU 
countries (-1) 
      
(2.29) (2.49) 
Membership Length   -0.01  -0.03  0.003  0.13  0.02  0.01 
  (-0.24)  (-0.76)  (0.02)  (0.84)  (0.41)  (0.34) 
Excessive Deficit Procedure         -1.29***  -1.07** 
         (-3.40)  (-2.54) 
European Parliament Elections          -1.99***  -1.87*** 
         (3.48)  (-3.06) 
Constant   36.29***  73.65***  21.49  19.94  12.40**  12.64*** 
  (3.30)  (5.96)  (1.67)  (1.66)  (2.31)  (2.42) 
Adjusted R - Squared  0.33  0.37  0.33  0.36  0.45  0.45 
Observations  139  93  103  104  348  355 
Number of countries at the 
period's beginning 
9  9  12  12  15  15 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: t statistics in brackets obtained with robust standard errors. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: *** 
1%, ** 5% and *10%. For all fixed effects models, Prob > F = 0, providing evidence of the existence of Fixed Effects. Robust 
standard errors used in all models.   27
Table 7 – Before and after the Maastricht Treaty 
   1974-1993  1994-2008 
   1  2  3  4 
Popularity (-1)  0.54***  0.65***  0.60*** 0.59*** 
  (9.24)  (12.30)  (5.59) (5.48) 
Popularity  (-2)  0.19  0.08  0.08 
 (2.85)**    (1.84)  (1.78) 
Inflation (-1)  -61.96  -29.04  -253.6*** -248.1*** 
  (-1.07)  (-0.70)  (-3.76) (-3.99) 
GDP Growth Rate (-1)  24.37**    -10.96  
  (3.19)    (-1.31)  
Growth Rate of the Unemployment Rate (-1)    -7.13**    
   (-2.67)    
Degree of Openness of the Economy (-1)  0.77  -0.57    
  (0.23)  (-0.13)    
Percentage of Trade with EU countries (-1)      18.75*  19.92* 
     (1.95)  (2.11) 
Membership Length   0.05  0.02  0.02 0.01 
  (1.06)  (0.43)  (0.41) (0.34) 
Excessive Deficit Procedure     -0.87** -0.73 
     (-2.82) (-1.79) 
European Parliament Elections      -2.92***  -2.91*** 
     (-4.23)  (-4.17) 
Constant   18.82***  27.20***  13.63** 12.97** 
  (4.04)  (4.44)  (2.65) (2.45) 
Adjusted R - Squared  0.62  0.51  0.44 0.44 
Observations  249  205  213 216 
Number of countries at the period's beginning  9  9  9 9 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: t statistics in brackets obtained with robust standard errors. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: *** 
1%, ** 5% and *10%. For all fixed effects models, Prob > F = 0, providing evidence of the existence of Fixed Effects. Robust 
standard errors used in all models. 
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